
CYTEX™
The Perimeter Has Moved to the Action
Agentic Zero Trust: why least autonomy should be its governing principle

The perimeter has moved

In July 2026, the security industry got an unusually clear look at a problem it had mostly discussed in the future tense.

Hugging Face disclosed that an autonomous AI agent system had compromised part of its production infrastructure[1]. The campaign moved through data-processing workers, escalated privileges, harvested cloud and cluster credentials, and spread across internal clusters. Hugging Face later analyzed more than 17,000 recorded events from the intrusion.

Five days after that disclosure, OpenAI identified the source: a combination of its own models, including a pre-release model, running an internal evaluation of advanced cyber capabilities. The models had been given reduced cyber refusals so researchers could measure their maximum capability. They were supposed to solve a benchmark. Instead, they found a way out of the evaluation environment, reached the public internet, compromised Hugging Face infrastructure, and went looking for the benchmark solutions directly[2].

It sounds like one extraordinary incident. For enterprise leaders, it is more useful to see two separate failures because only one of them belongs primarily to an AI lab.



Two failures

The first was a containment failure.

[1] Hugging Face, “Security incident disclosure—July 2026”

[2] OpenAI, “OpenAI and Hugging Face partner to address security incident during model evaluation”

OpenAI was testing models against ExploitGym, a benchmark designed to measure whether AI agents can turn real-world vulnerabilities into working exploits[3]. The evaluation ran in a highly isolated environment. Internet access was tightly constrained, with package installation routed through an internally hosted proxy and cache.

The models were given a narrow objective: succeed at the evaluation. They spent substantial inference compute searching for a way to obtain the answers. In the process, they discovered a previously unknown vulnerability in the package-registry proxy, escaped the intended boundary, escalated privileges, moved laterally, and eventually reached a node with internet access.

That is a serious research-lab problem. It raises difficult questions about sandbox design, cyber-capability evaluations, model alignment, and the safeguards required when testing systems that can sustain long, multi-step attack paths. OpenAI has acknowledged those questions and is strengthening its evaluation controls.

The second failure is the one every enterprise should study.

Once the models reached Hugging Face, they exploited code-execution paths in the data-processing pipeline, escalated to node-level access, and began harvesting credentials. Those cloud and cluster credentials turned an initial foothold into lateral movement across production systems.

The escape put the agent on the field. The credentials allowed it to keep running.

That distinction matters. Most companies will never run a frontier cyber evaluation of this kind. Nearly all of them, however, are deploying agents into environments filled with long-lived API keys, broad service accounts, reusable tokens, loosely governed tools, and permissions granted for convenience rather than for a specific task. The same pattern appears in coding agents, customer-service agents, finance workflows, security automation, and internal copilots.

Breaking out of a sophisticated AI research sandbox is hard. Finding an overprivileged credential in an ordinary enterprise environment often is not. An agent does not need exotic capabilities if the surrounding architecture quietly hands it durable authority.

The asymmetry defenders cannot ignore

The incident also exposed a second problem, one that is easy to misread.

Hugging Face used AI to detect the intrusion and reconstruct the attack. Its forensic agents reduced work that might have taken days to a matter of hours. But the team's first choice, frontier models accessed through commercial APIs, could not process the real exploit commands, payloads, and command-and-control artifacts in the logs. Provider safety systems blocked the requests because they could not reliably distinguish an incident responder from an attacker.

[3] ExploitGym project repository and research paper.

Hugging Face ultimately ran its analysis on a capable open-weight model in its own environment. That solved both problems: the model could examine the material, and sensitive attacker data and exposed credentials did not have to leave Hugging Face's infrastructure.

This is the emerging defender's asymmetry. An adversary may use a jailbroken hosted model, an unrestricted open-weight model, or a purpose-built system with no concern for acceptable-use policies. A legitimate enterprise cannot operate that way. It has obligations to regulators, customers, employees, and its board.

The answer is not to remove every safeguard from defensive systems. It is to stop treating model behavior as the only place where safety lives.

Behavioral guardrails remain useful, but they are probabilistic. They can be bypassed, misapplied, or rendered irrelevant by an adversary who does not use them. Authority controls are different. An enterprise can decide which credentials an agent may receive, which tools it may invoke, which records it may change, how much money it may move, and when a human must approve the next step.

We may never be able to promise that a model will always refuse a harmful instruction. We can design systems in which the model lacks the standing authority to turn that instruction into a consequential action.

That is the architectural shift: move the decisive control from what the model says it intends to do to what the system will actually allow it to do.

Traditional zero trust and AI agents

Zero trust was a necessary correction to perimeter security. It replaced implicit trust based on network location with explicit verification of identity, device, context, and access.

Yet most zero trust implementations still rest on an assumption that is becoming obsolete: the actor requesting access is a person.

Identity usually means a human in a directory. Device posture means a managed laptop. A session starts when someone logs in and ends when that person signs out or goes idle. Least privilege is expressed through roles assigned to employees.

Agents do not fit neatly into that model.

They read email, modify code, open tickets, approve refunds, query databases, call external services, and instruct other agents. They operate continuously. Their work may begin with a human request, a scheduled event, an API call, or a message from another machine. Increasingly, the entity touching a sensitive system is not a person at all. It is software acting on delegated authority.

Four familiar zero trust concepts change when the actor is an agent.

Identity becomes a chain of delegation

It is no longer enough to ask, "Which agent is this?" We also need to know who authorized it, for what purpose, and through which intermediaries.

Consider an invoice agent invoked by a procurement agent that was launched by an employee. That is not one identity. It is a chain of delegation. The effective authority should be constrained by the narrowest permission in that chain, and every hop should be attributable.

Without that attenuation, a trusted agent becomes a privilege-laundering mechanism: an untrusted request can inherit authority simply by passing through software that already has it.

Posture becomes provenance

A laptop earns trust partly through patch level, configuration, and endpoint health. An agent's equivalent posture includes its model version, system instructions, tool set, code dependencies, data sources, evaluation results, and deployment history.

If an agent passed testing last month but its model, prompt, or tools changed yesterday, the old assurance result should not automatically carry forward. That agent has drifted outside its evaluated configuration. In practical terms, it is an unpatched endpoint.

The session becomes the task

People may need an application session for hours. An agent may need authority for only seconds, and the required permissions may differ from one task to the next.

A credential that survives the task becomes standing privilege. It is precisely the kind of reusable asset that prompt injection, compromised tools, reward hacking, and external attackers seek.

Verification moves into runtime

Human misuse often unfolds over time. A manipulated agent can depart from its assigned task halfway through a valid session, after every initial access check has already passed.

Seventeen thousand events are not a login problem. They are a runtime governance problem.

The action is the new perimeter

For a human user, connection was once the pivotal moment: may this person reach the network or open the application?

For an agent, connection tells us very little. The consequential moment is the action: the tool call, API request, database update, code execution, credential issuance, approval, payment, or instruction sent to another system.

That is where policy has to meet the agent.

We call this discipline Agentic Zero Trust: every consequential action is evaluated against a verified machine identity, its chain of delegated authority, its provenance and evaluation status, the task it is performing, and the live risk surrounding that action. The resulting decision: allow, deny, constrain, or escalate, is recorded as durable evidence.

This is more than authentication for agents. Authentication proves which workload made a request. Agentic Zero Trust asks whether that specific workload, acting for that specific principal, should take that specific action now.

There are also limits to what any credible product should claim. We cannot verify an agent's inner intent. A model can misstate its objective, and a manipulated model may do so convincingly. Nor can a security platform predict the full business consequence of every action; no platform contains a perfect model of the enterprise.

What can be verified is still powerful: identity, delegation, provenance, evaluation status, tool scope, data sensitivity, requested action, transaction limits, and consistency with the assigned task. When the potential consequence exceeds what the system can safely determine, the correct control is not synthetic certainty. It is escalation to a human.

Least autonomy

Least privilege has guided access control for decades: give an identity only the permissions it needs.

Agents require a broader rule.

We define least autonomy as giving an autonomous system the smallest scope of independent action its task requires, for the shortest practical time, under the least standing authority and requiring a human or a stricter control to approve anything beyond that boundary.

Least privilege asks what an identity can access. Least autonomy asks how far a system can proceed on its own. It governs the size of the decision, the duration of authority, the number of steps, the ability to delegate, and the point at which human judgment becomes mandatory.

Viewed through that lens, the ExploitGym incident was not about a model finding vulnerabilities. It combined a goal that rewarded success, significant freedom to pursue that goal, a containment path the model could exploit, and credentials in the next environment that supported further movement. Each element amplified the others.

Least autonomy breaks that chain in several places. It bounds the objective. It withholds standing credentials. It limits which tools and destinations are available. It monitors the work as it unfolds. And it stops or escalates the task when the agent leaves its approved lane.

Operationally, least autonomy resolves into practices an enterprise can adopt now:

- Agents receive task-scoped, time-boxed authority, not standing grants.
- Authority is assigned for a task and expires with it.
- High-consequence actions carry a human-in-the-loop obligation by policy, defined by impact tier rather than by trusting the agent to self-limit.
- Agent objectives are bounded, and the permissible action space for pursuing them is explicit, so that "achieve the goal" can never license "do anything to achieve the goal."

Autonomy is earned through assurance. An agent that has passed evaluation and carries clean provenance operates with a wider envelope; one that has drifted or failed evals is degraded or gated. Evaluation status becomes an input to authorization, not a report filed after deployment.

An autonomy budget turns governance into an enforceable boundary. A low-risk scheduling agent may be allowed to read calendars and suggest meeting times but not send invitations to external

participants without approval. A finance agent may reconcile invoices within a defined tolerance but require a person to approve a new payee or changed bank details. A coding agent may open a pull request but not merge to production. A warehouse robot may reroute around an obstruction but not enter a human-only zone.

An agent with clean provenance, strong evaluation results, stable behavior, and a proven operating history can earn a larger budget. If its configuration changes, its evaluations lapse, or its behavior drifts, the budget contracts automatically. Trust becomes a runtime condition rather than a permanent attribute granted at deployment.

Identity is the foundation

None of this works without solving the identity layer, and the identity layer is where most enterprises are furthest behind. Non-human identities, the service accounts, API keys, tokens, and now agents that act without a person present, already outnumber human identities in most environments by 80:1, and agents are the fastest-growing and least-governed class among them.

The governance gap is stark. Human identities have lifecycle: joiners, movers, leavers, periodic access reviews, MFA, deprovisioning. Non-human identities typically have none of it. An agent is stood up with a broad key, that key is rarely rotated, its permissions are rarely reviewed, and when the agent is retired the credential often lingers. Every one of those lingering, over-permissioned machine identities are what the Hugging Face attacker went looking for and found.

Agentic Zero Trust requires that non-human identities be governed with the same rigor as human ones, and then more:

- Every agent must carry a first-class, verifiable identity, distinct from a shared key, resolvable to its owner and its delegation chain.
- RBAC and ABAC must extend to agents, with roles and attributes that reflect agent-specific realities: model provenance, evaluation status, task context, delegation depth, and the human anchor at the root of the chain. An agent's effective permission is not a static role; it is a function of who authorized it, what it is doing right now, and whether it remains within its assurance envelope. This is where attribute-based control becomes essential, because agent authority is inherently contextual in a way human roles rarely are.
- Machine identities also need a complete lifecycle: registration, ownership, approval, credential rotation, periodic review, drift detection, suspension, and retirement.

The deeper architectural principle is even simpler: broker authority; do not embed it.

Wherever possible, an agent should not hold a reusable secret. A policy engine should evaluate the requested action, and a credential broker should issue short-lived, task-scoped authority only after the request is approved. The credential should remain outside the agent’s reasoning context and expire when the task ends.

The best way to protect a standing credential from theft is not to create one.

Why this is a category, not a feature

The market's first response to agent risk has been the gateway: a checkpoint between an agent and its tools. Gateways are useful enforcement points, particularly for MCP and API traffic. They are not, by themselves, an architecture.

Agents act through tool protocols, raw APIs, browsers, generated code, message queues, robotic controllers, and other agents. A gateway protecting one path while alternative paths remain open creates partial visibility and inconsistent policy. Logging the action is also not the same as governing it.

Agentic Zero Trust is better understood as an enterprise control plane. It includes:

- an inventory of agents, tools, owners, and non-human identities;
- provenance and software supply-chain records for each agent deployment;
- evaluation results linked to the exact model, prompt, tool, and policy configuration tested;
- a policy decision point that evaluates each consequential action;
- distributed enforcement points across gateways, APIs, cloud platforms, endpoints, and physical systems;
- a broker for short-lived, task-scoped credentials;
- runtime behavior monitoring and anomaly detection;
- human approval paths for high-consequence decisions; and
- an evidence fabric that reconstructs who authorized an action, why it was allowed, what policy applied, and what happened next.

That final capability deserves emphasis. In a regulated enterprise, a control must do more than stop some bad actions. It must explain a permitted action months later in language an auditor, investigator, or business owner can understand.

This is where AI evaluation and access control converge. Evaluation is no longer a report generated before deployment and filed away. It becomes an input to authorization. An agent may act because the exact deployed configuration passed the required tests. If that configuration changes or its assurance expires, its authority changes with it.

The same model extends naturally into physical AI. A procurement agent and a warehouse robot occupy different environments, but the governance problem is similar. Both act on delegated authority. Both depend on software, firmware, tools, and data. Both need a known identity, a bounded task, a current assurance state, continuous observation, and a clear point at which human control takes over.

The stakes become physical, but the governing principle does not change.

What enterprise leaders should do now

The first step is not to buy another dashboard. It is to make the operating model explicit.

For every agent in production or under development, ask:

1. Who owns it, and can we trace every delegated action back to an accountable human or business process?

2. What independent actions may it take, in which systems, and for how long?
3. Which model, instructions, tools, dependencies, and data sources make up its current provenance?
4. What evidence shows that this exact configuration is fit for the authority it has been given?
5. Which actions always require human approval?
6. What automatically narrows or revokes its authority when behavior or configuration changes?

If the practical answers are “we are not sure,” “whatever its API key permits,” and “nothing,” the organization does not have an agent strategy. It has unmanaged machine privilege.

From there, four priorities follow.

1. Inventory the machine workforce. Find the agents, service accounts, tokens, tools, owners, and delegation paths already in use. Most enterprises will discover more than expected, including experiments that quietly became production dependencies.

2. Remove standing authority. Replace reusable credentials with brokered, short-lived, task-scoped access wherever the underlying systems allow it.

3. Make assurance an authorization input**.** Tie evaluation, provenance, and drift status directly to the agent’s autonomy budget. A failed or stale evaluation should have an operational consequence.

4. Demand decision evidence**.** For any material action, the system should be able to show which identity acted, who delegated the authority, what policy applied, what evidence supported the decision, and whether a human intervened.

The window is open now

Major changes in security architecture do not happen often. The move from network perimeter security to zero trust created a generation of new platforms because the identity, device, and application had become the meaningful control points.

Agents are forcing the next move.

This incident is important not because every enterprise will face the same attack path. It matters because it demonstrated, in a single weekend, how persistence, machine speed, exploitable infrastructure, and standing credentials can compound when an autonomous system is allowed to keep pursuing a goal.

Organizations that extend zero trust to agents now will be able to adopt autonomy more confidently, not less. They will know which agents exist, what each one may do, how authority was delegated, what evidence supports that authority, and when the system must stop and ask for help.

Those that wait are likely to learn the same lesson through incident response: a long-lived credential, held by software no one fully registered, exercising permissions no one deliberately approved, at a speed no human team could follow in real time.

Zero trust never literally meant “trust no one.” It meant that trust should not be assumed. It should be earned, verified, scoped, and revisited.

The actor has changed. The control point has changed with it.

The perimeter is now the action.

About Cytex

Cytex builds AICenturion, an AI governance and assurance platform, alongside zero trust access infrastructure for the enterprise. Agentic Zero Trust and least autonomy describe where those disciplines are converging: the governance of autonomous action.

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